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Perception and action are intricately linked. Perception provides
the requisite information for selecting and guiding actions adap-
tively (Gibson, 1958). For example, we require visual information
to steer a car along a winding road, navigate around a puddle, or
turn to squeeze into a crowded elevator. Visual information spec-
iﬁes when the curve is too sharp for the current speed, the puddle
too wide to allow a detour, or the opening too narrow to ﬁt the
body. In these cases, visual information alerts us to possibilities
for action in advance so that we can guide actions adaptively.
Possibilities for action—what Gibson (1979) termed ‘‘affor-
dances”—depend on the current ﬁt between the physical properties
of the body and the physical features of the environment (Adolph &
Berger, 2006; Warren, 1984). For example, squeezing through a
narrow doorway might be possible for a small child but impossible
for a large adult; a person with a more ﬂexible chest region can
push through a smaller opening than someone of the same size
with a less compliant body. For a given individual, the dimensions
and dynamic capabilities of the body relative to the dimensions
and pliability of the doorway determine whether the opening is
passable. Affordances change from moment to moment because
the body and environment are continually in ﬂux (Adolph & Berger,
2006; Michaels, 2003): On the actor’s side of the affordance rela-
tion, bulky clothing, protruding accessories, or a stiff neck can
change possibilities for squeezing through openings; reciprocally,
adjustments in the size of the opening or the amount of resistancell rights reserved.
sychology, New York Univer-
0003, USA.
h).to pressure can change the environment side of the affordance
relation (Adolph, Eppler, & Gibson, 1993). Thus, possibilities for ac-
tion vary with changes in local conditions.
Previous research shows that people perceive possibilities for
action relative to body and environmental constraints. When
tested with openings varying in size, participants attempted to
reach through openings larger than their hand size and refused
to attempt openings smaller than their hand size (Ishak, Adolph,
& Lin, 2008). They spontaneously minimized hand size by pressing
their ﬁngers together and accurately scaled attempts to their com-
pressed hand size. When hand size was enlarged with a prosthesis
that added a centimeter to the width of their hands, participants
instantly rescaled their perceptual judgments to their new hand
size as they brought their hand up to the opening.
Similarly, people perceive affordances for navigating their
whole bodies through openings (Higuchi, Takada, Matsuura, &
Imanaka, 2004; Wagman & Malek, 2007; Wagman & Taylor,
2005; Warren & Whang, 1987). When viewing doorways varying
in width, participants walked through doorways larger than their
body size and refused to attempt doorways smaller than their body
size within 2–3 cm of accuracy (Franchak, van der Zalm, Hartzler, &
Adolph, 2009). Participants turned sideways to accommodate
narrow doorways, meaning that they perceived doorway width
relative to their smallest sideways dimensions, even though they
approached the doorways with their bodies facing forward.
Pregnant women rescaled their perceptual judgments to reﬂect
changing affordances as their bellies grew throughout the course
of their pregnancies and shrank postpartum (Franchak et al.,
2009). Despite the rapid changes in their bodies, the pregnant
women were just as accurate as participants in a control group
(including men) who were not (and had never been) pregnant.
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doorways (Higuchi et al., 2004) or under barriers (Stoffregen, Yang,
Giveans, Flanagan, & Bardy, 2009) while sitting in a wheelchair.
How is it that participants can judge affordances for passage so
accurately? In the case of ﬁtting the hand through an opening (e.g.,
Ishak et al., 2008), participants can view their hand size against the
size of the opening prior to reaching through it. In fact, participants
sometimes raised their hand to the opening and then lowered it
after deciding that it would not ﬁt. But, in the case of walking or
rolling through a doorway in a wheelchair, participants cannot
view their bodies and the opening at the same time. Moreover,
while actually walking through narrow doorways, participants
spontaneously turn sideways and contort their bodies (sucking in
belly, wriggling side to side) as they squeeze through (Franchak
et al., 2009). Thus the deﬁning body dimensions (e.g., sideways tor-
so depth and body compliance) are not easily accessible to vision.
What sources of information are available to guide actions when
the relevant body dimensions are not readily visible?
Previous research shows that adults judge affordances relative
to intrinsic information about their bodies (Mark, 1987; Mark, Bail-
let, Craver, Douglas, & Fox, 1990; Warren, 1984; Warren & Whang,
1987). Eye-height, for example, is used to make judgments about
the distance and relative size of doorways (Warren & Whang,
1987) and to judge affordances for stair climbing and sitting (Mark,
1987; Mark et al., 1990). Manipulating eye height—by dressing
participants in platform shoes—altered their perceptual judgments
of climb-up-able stair heights and sit-on-able chairs in line with
their new, taller dimensions. Recalibration is not merely the output
of a cognitive strategy due to awareness of altered eye height.
When participants stood on a false ﬂoor that covertly increased
their eye height, they recalibrated their judgments of passable
doorway widths in line with their altered dimensions: Participants
in the raised ﬂoor condition consistently overestimated their abil-
ities to ﬁt through doorways, but participants in the ﬂat ﬂoor con-
dition did not. Participants were unaware of the ﬂoor
manipulation, suggesting that the reliance on eye-height informa-
tion is an automatic perceptual process.2. Can action inform perception?
Previous research on affordance perception emphasizes the role
of perception in guiding action. Presumably, however, the relation
between perception and action is not one-sided. Perception and ac-
tion are linked in a continuous feedback loop; every action pro-
vides feedback about the just-performed movement and
generates information that can be used for guiding the next move-
ment (Adolph & Berger, 2006; Patla, 1998). As Gibson (1979) ar-
gued, ‘‘We must perceive in order to move, but we must also
move in order to perceive” (p. 223).
Simply being in motion can facilitate perception of affordances.
For example, to dodge trafﬁc while crossing a busy street (Oude-
jans, Michaels, van Dort, & Frissen, 1996) or gauge whether a ﬂy
ball is catchable (Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker, & Dolne, 1996),
movement leads to increased accuracy in perceiving affordances.
Pedestrians who walked up to the curb matched crossing time
more closely to the time allowed by trafﬁc ﬂow compared with
observers who judged whether to cross from a static position
(Oudejans, Michaels, van Dort et al., 1996). Participants who took
a few running steps in the outﬁeld made more accurate judgments
about their ability to catch ﬂy balls compared with stationary
observers (Oudejans, Michaels, Bakker et al., 1996). Being in mo-
tion facilitates perception of affordances because movements pro-
vide information about the dynamic capabilities of the body.
Ongoing movements also facilitate perception of changing
affordance relations. For example, platform shoes increase leglength, thereby increasing the height of chairs that are possible
to sit on (Mark et al., 1990). When ﬁrst standing up in their plat-
form shoes, participants erred in the direction of their familiar
leg length. But perceptual judgments of maximum seat height be-
came more accurate over successive trials. Learning the new affor-
dance relations required only subtle stepping and swaying
movements of the body. When postural movements were elimi-
nated by requiring participants to press their backs against a wall,
judgments were inaccurate and did not improve over trials. A later
investigation showed that speciﬁc patterns of incidental postural
sway predict learning (Stoffregen, Yang, & Bardy, 2005).
Some movements are intentionally exploratory, that is, per-
formed expressly for the purpose of gathering information. For
example, touching a ground surface provides a wealth of informa-
tion about size, slant, rigidity, and friction that can be used to
gauge affordances and sharpen up perceptual judgments (Joh &
Adolph, 2006). Even novice walking infants exhibit intentional
exploratory movements, such as touching the edge of a slope with
their feet or hands, to gain information about the stability and fric-
tion of the surface (Adolph, 1995, 1997).
Information generated by ongoing movements and exploratory
activity may have considerable overlap with information obtained
while performing the target action. For example, the information
obtained during ongoing locomotion or while approaching an
obstacle for exploration (visual ﬂow, motion parallax, postural
sway, etc.) is likely similar to the information obtained during
the approach for performance (e.g., passing through the narrow
doorway). But additional sources of information may arise as the
result of performing the target action, a sort of learning by doing:
the outcome (success or failure) and degree of difﬁculty of the ac-
tion, the penalty for errors, and the visual, haptic, and propriocep-
tive feedback that is correlated with performance (Adolph &
Berger, 2006; Adolph et al., 1993). Sliding easily through a large
doorway and becoming wedged in a too-small doorway provide
differential feedback about the affordance for passage. The percep-
tual learning literature is replete with examples showing that feed-
back (or knowledge of results) improves the accuracy of judgments
of object properties, such as the length of wielded rods or the rel-
ative mass of colliding balls (Jacobs, Michaels, & Runeson, 2000;
Wagman, McBride, & Trefzger, 2008; Withagen & Michaels, 2005).
Besides providing feedback information about whether the ac-
tion succeeded or failed, the act of squeezing through a doorway
might help walkers detect information about their bodies that they
might not be able to perceive by other means. Speciﬁcally, ﬁtting
through a small opening depends not only on the size of the body,
but also the degree to which it can compress. And body compres-
sion is variable between individuals—compression in sagittal body
depth ranged from 3 to 8 cm in a sample of college-aged partici-
pants, a 10–24% reduction in sideways body dimensions (Franchak
et al., 2009). Although there may be other ways to learn about the
compression of the body, actually squeezing into a small space pro-
vides direct and immediate information about the body’s dynamic
capabilities.
Previous research provides inconclusive evidence about the ef-
fects of learning by doing. In some studies, performing the target
action facilitated perception of affordances. For example, partici-
pants demonstrated one-trial learning after falling on a deformable
foam surface on their initial attempt to walk over a platform (Joh &
Adolph, 2006). On subsequent trials, participants leaped over the
foam pit or stepped gingerly into it to avoid falling. When explor-
ing a novel action system—locomoting in a wheelchair—perceptual
judgments improved with experience navigating through door-
ways, but only after 8 days of practice (Higuchi et al., 2004).
However, other lines of evidence suggest that perceptual judg-
ments do not beneﬁt from performing the target action. Practice
sitting on variable chair heights (with and without platform shoes)
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sitting (Mark et al., 1990). One session of practice navigating a
wheelchair through doorways did not lead to more accurate judg-
ments about affordances for passage (Higuchi et al., 2004). Practice
navigating a wheelchair under barriers that varied in overhead
clearance did not lead to more accurate judgments compared with
participants who simply practiced wheeling around (Stoffregen
et al., 2009). Similarly, crawling and walking infants who received
intense daily or weekly practice descending slopes were no better
at perceiving affordances than infants who simply practiced crawl-
ing and walking on ﬂat ground at home (Adolph, 1997; Adolph, Ta-
mis-LeMonda, Ishak, Karasik, & Lobo, 2008; Gill, Adolph, &
Vereijken, 2009). Thus, the question of whether action perfor-
mance facilitates perception of affordances remains open.
3. Current study
In the current study, participants completed two tasks in suc-
cession: an action performance task and a perceptual judgment
task. The action task served two purposes: It gave participants
experience squeezing through narrow doorways and it provided
us with an estimate of the affordances for passage. Participants at-
tempted to walk through doorways of varying width, and we esti-
mated affordance thresholds based on the smallest doorway they
passed through on 50% of trials. The perception task was designed
to assess how accurately participants perceived affordances for
passage. Participants reported their judgments while standing
2.5 m away from the doorway. We estimated perceptual judgment
thresholds based on the smallest doorway they judged to be pass-
able on 50% of trials. The difference between the two estimates
provided a measure of perceptual judgment error.
To test the effect of action performance on perception of
affordances, an action-ﬁrst group walked through doorways before
making perceptual judgments, and a perception-ﬁrst group made
perceptual judgments before walking through doorways. We
focused on two sources of evidence for learning by doing. First,
increased accuracy of perceptual judgments following experience
performing the target action would indicate a facilitative effect of
action performance. Second, practice performing the action might
induce participants to adopt a more robust scaling factor. If
perceiving affordances is independent of action feedback, then
participants should make similarly accurate perceptual judgments
in both the perception-ﬁrst and action-ﬁrst conditions. If, however,
action feedback affects perception of affordances, then participants
in the action-ﬁrst condition should judge affordances more
accurately than those in the perception-ﬁrst group and show
evidence of better scaling to relevant body dimensions.
We focused on affordances for walking through doorways for
several reasons. First, walking through narrow openings is a highly
practiced, everyday task. As in reaching through openings, passage
during locomotion does not depend solely on static, geometric
dimensions of the body relative to the doorway. Compression of
the body is dynamic and depends on body composition and pain
tolerance. Some people can bear very little compression, but others
have bodies with more give. Other dynamic factors during
approach to the doorway such as walking speed, and direction
and degree of body rotation affect the likelihood of success
(Franchak et al., 2009). As a result, there was no a priori way to
determine participants’ affordance thresholds before they walked
through the doorway. Thus, we could not provide a feedback-only
condition to separate action performance from feedback.
Moreover, unlike previous studies that report pi numbers—relating
the critical dimensions of the environment to dimensions of the
body (Warren, 1984; Warren & Whang, 1987)—we could not
calculate pi numbers because the affordance relation does not
depend on a single, critical body dimension.An especially interesting aspect of perceiving affordances for
passage is that participants cannot see their bodies relative to
the doorway. The relevant body dimensions are not readily
accessible for visual comparison when making judgments from a
distance or while walking through the doorway. In contrast, while
reaching through openings, the hand remains in the visual ﬁeld
framed against the opening (Ishak et al., 2008). Furthermore,
perception and action involve different body orientations. Judging
doorway passage is challenging because participants make
judgments from a frontal body orientation, but most people
spontaneously turn sideways to pass through narrow doorways.
They judge doorways from a different position during approach
compared with the position used to walk through.
4. Method
4.1. Participants
Twenty-ﬁve college students (13 female, 12male) participated to
fulﬁll a course requirement. One participant was excluded for not
following instructions. Participants’ mean age was 20.56 years
(range = 18 to 24 years). All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
4.2. Apparatus
We constructed a wooden platform with an adjustable doorway
(Fig. 1). Participants walked over the elevated platform (490 cm
long  98 cm wide  64 cm high). A stationary wall (122 cm
wide  173 cm high) attached to the platform stood perpendicular
to a moving wall (114 cmwide  191 cm high). The stationary wall
provided support along the edge of the walkway so that partici-
pants did not feel uncomfortable walking near the walkway’s edge
as they approached the doorway. The movable wall adjusted in
0.2 cm increments to create doorways ranging in width from 0 to
70 cm. Trials began from a starting line 2.5 m from the doorway.
A screen behind the doorway prevented participants from using
landmarks in the room to judge doorway width.
Three cameras recorded each trial: a panning side-camera fol-
lowed participants as they walked toward the doorway; an over-
head camera captured their movements as they passed through
the doorway; a measurement camera projected calibration mark-
ings onto a monitor, allowing precise adjustments of the doorway.
A digital capture computer mixed all three views into a single vi-
deo ﬁle recorded at 30 frames/s.
4.3. Procedure
Participants were assigned in alternating order to an action-ﬁrst
condition (completed the action performance task before the per-
ceptual judgment task) or a perception-ﬁrst condition (completed
the perceptual judgment task before the action performance task).
Each order was counterbalanced for gender.
In the action performance task, participants completed 20 trials
in which they attempted to walk through each doorway. Partici-
pants were instructed to walk through each doorway regardless
of whether they believed they could ﬁt. They faced away from
the doorway while an experimenter adjusted the width and then
attempted to walk through the doorway when cued. Participants
were told that they could use any strategy to walk through the
doorway. Every participant turned sideways to ﬁt through narrow
doorways. In addition, many went on tiptoes or sucked in their
stomachs while attempting to squeeze through the narrowest
doorways. The experimenter coded each trial as a success (passed
through doorway) or failure (squeezed their body into the door-
way, but could not ﬁt through).
Fig. 1. Adjustable doorway apparatus.
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dance function for each participant based on the proportion of suc-
cesses at each doorway width (triangular symbols in Fig. 2). As in
Ishak and colleagues’ (2008) procedure, functions were ﬁt to a
cumulative normal distribution using maximum likelihood esti-
mates for the slope and threshold. The affordance threshold was
a point estimate of a 50% success rate. For the ﬁrst 6–8 trials, the
experimenter used a binary search procedure to ﬁnd a rough esti-
mate of each participant’s affordance threshold—on successive tri-
als, the experimenter presented the doorway width at the
midpoint between the smallest doorway the participant walked
through and the largest doorway the participant failed to walk
through to hone in on the threshold doorway width. Then, partic-
ipants received 12–14 randomly selected doorway widths within a
3 standard deviation range of the current threshold estimate. All 20
trials were used to calculate each participant’s affordance function.
In the perceptual judgment task, participants completed 40
trials in which they responded ‘‘yes” if they judged they could ﬁt
through the doorway and ‘‘no” if they judged they could not. The
experimenter explained that ‘‘ﬁtting through the doorway” meant
turning their bodies to the side and squeezing into the doorway.Doorway Width (cm)
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Fig. 2. Example data from one participant. Triangles show the proportion of trials
with successful passage at each doorway width in the action task. Circles show
proportion of ‘yes’ responses during the perception task. The affordance function
(black) is ﬁt to success rate and the perceptual judgment function (gray) is ﬁt to the
rate of ‘yes’ responses. The dashed line represents judgment error—the discrepancy
between the 50% thresholds of each function.Participants faced away from the doorway while an experimenter
adjusted the width. They turned to face the doorway when cued
and then stood on the starting line and reported their decision.
We calculated the proportion of ‘‘yes” responses at each doorway
width (circular symbols in Fig. 2), and used the same procedure
to estimate perceptual judgment functions and thresholds as affor-
dance functions. We collected 40 trials for the perceptual judgment
task compared with 20 for the action performance task because pi-
lot data revealed greater variability of perceptual judgment func-
tions (compared to affordance functions), suggesting that more
trials would be required to determine an accurate perceptual judg-
ment function.
At the end of the session, experimenters measured participants’
standing height (with a stadiometer), weight (on a digital scale),
and torso dimensions (from photographs). Preliminary data
showed that chest circumference measurements are noisy due to
participants’ breathing and difﬁculty identifying appropriate body
landmarks, so we used a computer program (ImageJ) to calculate
participants’ widest frontal and sagittal torso dimensions from
photographs with a visible, standard metric. The entire session
took approximately 45 min.5. Results
5.1. Affordances for passage
Across conditions, affordance thresholds ranged from 14.40 to
23.60 cm (M = 18.92 cm). Affordance thresholds in the action-ﬁrst
(M = 18.90 cm, SD = 2.46) and perception-ﬁrst conditions (M =
18.95 cm, SD = 1.84) were nearly identical, t(22) = 0.07, p > .05.
The slope parameters of participants’ affordance functions were
equally small in both groups (action-ﬁrst: M = 0.19, SD = 0.25;
perception-ﬁrst: M = 0.32, SD = 0.28), t(22) = 1.13, p > .05, indicat-
ing a sharp transition from passable to impassable openings.
Individual differences in affordance thresholds reﬂected variations
in participants’ body dimensions. The ﬁrst column of Table 1 shows
the correlations between affordance thresholds and four body
measurements (height, weight, frontal width, sagittal width). All
fourmeasurements positively correlatedwith affordance threshold,
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Fig. 3. Relation between weight and affordance thresholds across all participants.
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could ﬁt through smaller doorways. Weight correlated most
strongly with affordance thresholds (Fig. 3). Weight, height, frontal,
and sagittal dimensions were intercorrelated, rs(22) > .36, ps < .09.
Because all four body dimensions were correlated with affor-
dance thresholds and because body dimensions were intercorrelat-
ed, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression to determine the
unique contributions of the four body dimensions in explaining the
variance in threshold doorway size. Predictors were entered one at
a time to observe the individual effects of each on R2, partialling
out the effects of previously entered predictors. To test whether
weight was indeed the best predictor of affordance thresholds,
we entered the three other body measurements ﬁrst followed by
weight to see whether weight could explain unique variance after
controlling for the other three. Together, height, frontal width, and
sagittal width accounted for 47.8% of the variance in doorway pass-
ing ability. Adding weight to the model explained an additional
19.4% of the variance, indicating that weight was the strongest pre-
dictor of affordance threshold. The ﬁnal model using all four pre-
dictors accounted for 67.2% of variance in affordance thresholds,
F(4, 17) = 8.69, p < .01.5.2. Perceptual judgments
Across conditions, perceptual judgment thresholds ranged from
12.15 to 26.30 cm (M = 18.48 cm, SD = 3.67). Perceptual judgment
thresholds did not differ between the action-ﬁrst (M = 17.87 cm,
SD = 3.29) and perception-ﬁrst conditions (M = 19.10 cm, SD =
4.06), t(22) = 0.82, p > .05. Judgments in the perception-ﬁrst condi-
tion were equally variable (based on the slope parameters) com-
pared with judgments in the action-ﬁrst condition, t(22) = 1.51,
p > .05. Overall, slope parameters of perceptual judgment functions
(M = 1.11 cm, SD = 0.63) were larger than slope parameters of affor-
dance functions, t(23) = 6.19, p < .05, indicating that perceptual
judgments were variable relative to actual possibilities for action.5.3. Perceptual judgment errors
The degree to which perceptual judgment thresholds related to
affordance thresholds represents how accurately participants
scaled judgments to their actual abilities. Across both groups,
affordance and perceptual judgment thresholds were strongly cor-
related, r(22) = .60, p < .01, (Fig. 4). But this relation did not hold
equally across the two conditions: Perception-ﬁrst participants
showed a relatively weak correspondence between judgments
and abilities, r(10) = .40, p > .05, whereas action-ﬁrst participants
closely matched judgments to abilities, r(10) = .84, p < .01.
The difference between perceptual judgment and affordance
thresholds provided a measure of judgment error (dashed line inTable 1
Correlations between body dimensions, affordance thresholds, and perceptual
judgment thresholds.
Body dimension Affordance threshold Perceptual judgment threshold
Both conditions Action ﬁrst Perception ﬁrst
Height .62** .93** .28
n = 24 n = 12 n = 12
Weight .77** .89** .02
n = 24 n = 12 n = 12
Frontal width .55** .61* .18
n = 23 n = 11 n = 12
Sagittal width .46* .62* .18
n = 22 n = 11 n = 11
* p < 0.05 level.
** p < 0.01 level.Fig. 2). Positive judgment error indicates that participants tended
to overestimate which doorways were possible by responding
‘yes’ to doorways that were impossibly small. Conversely, negative
judgment error indicates that participants tended to underesti-
mate what doorways were possible by saying ‘no’ to possible door-
ways. Overall, judgment errors did not differ from 0 (M = 0.44 cm,
SD = 2.93), t(23) = .73, p > .05. Participants were just as likely to
overestimate or underestimate their ability to ﬁt, and judgment er-
ror did not differ between conditions, t(22) = 0.99, p > .05.
However, mean judgment error did not truly measure the accu-
racy of judgments because positive and negative errors canceled
each other out. To better assess judgment accuracy, we calculated
the absolute value of judgment errors—the overall magnitude of
each participant’s error regardless of error direction. Absolute
judgment errors differed from 0, indicating that performance was
not perfect (M = 2.36 cm, SD = 1.72), t(23) = 6.72, p < .01. But abso-
lute judgment errors were greater for participants in the percep-
tion-ﬁrst condition (M = 3.11 cm, SD = 1.85) relative to those in
the action-ﬁrst condition (M = 1.62 cm, SD = 1.26), t(22) = 2.30,
p < .05, revealing a beneﬁt to accuracy for participants who re-
ceived action feedback.5.4. Body dimensions and perceptual judgments
Perceptual judgments were fairly accurate for all participants,
but were more accurate for participants who performed the target
action prior to making perceptual judgments. Since body dimen-
sions largely determined affordances, accurate perceptual judg-
ments should be scaled to body dimensions. Because action-ﬁrst
participants made more accurate judgments, there should be a
stronger relation between their judgments and body dimensions
than for participants in the perception-ﬁrst condition. The secondAffordance Threshold (cm)
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Fig. 4. Relation between affordance thresholds and perceptual judgment thresholds
by condition.
Table 2
Hierarchical regression testing the contributions of weight, sagittal width, frontal
width, and height in predicting perceptual judgment thresholds for action-ﬁrst
participants.
Predictor R2 R2 change
Weight .794 .794**
Sagittal width .795 .001
Frontal width .797 .002
Height .899 .102*
Final model F(4, 6) = 13.338**
* p < 0.05 level.
** p < 0.01 level.
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ceptual judgment thresholds and the four body measures for the
action-ﬁrst and perception-ﬁrst groups. Perceptual judgments
and body dimensions were highly correlated for action-ﬁrst partic-
ipants, rs(10)P .61, ps < .05 (Fig. 5). Although perception-ﬁrst par-
ticipants erred by only 1.5 cm more than action-ﬁrst participants,
their judgments did not signiﬁcantly correlate with any measure
of body dimensions (ps > .05, Fig. 5).
To determine which body dimensions action-ﬁrst participants
scaled judgments to, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression
to measure the unique contributions of each body measurement in
explaining the variance in perceptual judgment thresholds (Ta-
ble 2). Since weight was the best predictor of affordance thresh-
olds, we expected that it might be the best scaling factor for
perceptual judgments. However, the strongest correlation was be-
tween height and perceptual judgment thresholds (Table 1). We
ﬁrst entered weight into the regression, and it accounted for
79.4% of the variance in judgment threshold. Entering frontal and
sagittal body dimensions only accounted for an additional 0.3% of
variance, indicating that neither predictor could explain any vari-
ance that weight did not account for. Yet, height accounted for
an additional 10.2% of the variance after controlling for the other
three predictors, suggesting that height information may play a
role in participants’ judgments. All four predictors accounted for
a total of 89.9% of the variance, F(4, 6) = 13.34, p < .01. Note, remov-
ing the tall outlier from the action-ﬁrst group does not change the
direction or degree of these effects.
In a second regression model, we entered height in the ﬁrst
block and the other three predictors together in a second block.
When entered ﬁrst, height accounted for 86.8% of the variance
in perceptual judgments thresholds for action-ﬁrst participants.
The other three predictors did not account for any signiﬁcant var-
iance after controlling for height. Taken together, these two hier-
archical regression models strongly suggest that action-ﬁrst
participants scaled their perceptual judgments to height (or a
combination of factors that includes height information) even
though weight was the best predictor for their actual affordance
thresholds.
If the improvements in accuracy were the result of height scal-
ing, then participants in the perception-ﬁrst group should have
been more accurate if they made judgments that scaled to height.
We calculated linear regression parameters that predicted percep-
tual judgment thresholds from height in the action-ﬁrst group.
Using these parameters and participants’ heights, we predicted
height-scaled perceptual judgment thresholds (PJT) for partici-
pants in the perception-ﬁrst condition:
PJTpredicted ¼ ð0:66 heightÞ  25:67 ð1ÞHeight (cm)
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Fig. 5. Relations between participants’ height andIndeed, perceptual judgments would have been more accurate
had they been scaled to height: Absolute judgment error would
have been reduced from 3.11 cm to 2.09 cm for the perception-ﬁrst
group. Of the 12 participants, 9 would have reduced the magnitude
of their errors had they scaled judgments to height alone.6. Discussion
The current study investigated the effect of learning by doing.
Performing the target action of walking through doorways facili-
tated participants’ judgments about the affordances for passage
compared to participants who did not have speciﬁc experience
with the target action. Action-ﬁrst participants scaled perceptual
judgments to their body dimensions more closely than participants
in the perception-ﬁrst group.
The action task allowed us to calculate affordance functions for
each participant. High measurement resolution (0.2 cm) proved to
be critical: The probability of ﬁtting through the doorway steeply
dropped from possible to impossible over a span of only a few mil-
limeters. Small changes in doorway width drastically altered the
affordance for passage. Furthermore, affordances thresholds varied
from individual to individual: Some participants could ﬁt through
doorways as small as 14.4 cm, but others could not pass through a
23.6 cm doorway. Body dimensions accounted for the individual
differences in affordance thresholds, with weight as the best pre-
dictor of threshold doorway width. To our surprise, sagittal body
width—participants’ smallest sideways dimension—and frontal
body width were the weakest predictors. Possibly, our technique
of estimating body width from photographs was noisy compared
with height and weight. Furthermore, the geometry of the body
while standing freely does not reﬂect the compressability of the
body while squeezing through narrow openings.
The action task served a second purpose. It provided the action-
ﬁrst group with experience performing the target action. On each
of the 20 trials, participants walked up to the doorway and at-Height (cm)
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perceptual judgment thresholds by condition.
2764 J.M. Franchak et al. / Vision Research 50 (2010) 2758–2765tempted toﬁt through. Previous studies that failed toﬁndaneffect of
action performance used practice trials thatwere distributedwidely
from possible to impossible. Because of the high resolution of the
apparatus, we were able to present participants with doorway sizes
in a narrow region relative to their thresholds—small changes in
doorway size from trial to trial shifted the outcome from success
to failure. Possibly, practice performing the target action in the crit-
ical region around the threshold explains why the current study
showed an effect of action performance when other studies did not.
The average judgment error for participants who ﬁrst performed
the target action was 1.5 cm more accurate than participants who
made perceptual judgments without action experience. The differ-
ence in performancewas reliable, but small inmagnitude. The small
size of the effect compared tomeasurement resolutionmay also ex-
plain why other studies failed to ﬁnd evidence of learning by doing.
Higuchi and colleagues (Higuchi et al., 2004) probed judgments
using aperture increments of 5 cm (compared to 0.2 cm in the cur-
rent study). Stoffregen and colleagues (2009) used the method of
constant adjustment to ﬁnd judgment thresholds, however, their
screen apparatus moved at 2 cm/s—they did not report the mini-
mum adjustment increment.
In previous studies, participants’ verbal estimates about ﬁtting
through doorways overestimated the spatial requirements (Higu-
chi et al., 2004; Warren & Whang, 1987). Researchers attributed
this bias in judgments to a so-called ‘‘safety margin”—participants
consistently reported that passable doorways were impossible to
ﬁt through. However, in the current study, we found no systematic
bias in the direction of errors. Roughly half the sample erred on the
side of caution, as in previous studies, but the other half erred in
the opposite direction by choosing doorways that were too small
to successfully navigate. Possibly, the task used in previous stud-
ies—walking through without turning the shoulders or touching
the sides of the doorway—biased participants to adopt a more con-
servative strategy than participants in the current study, who were
free to turn their bodies and attempt to squeeze through.
Unlike previous studies, we did not compare the effect of per-
forming the target action to a condition of non-speciﬁc movement
experience (e.g., Higuchi et al., 2004; Stoffregen et al., 2009). We do
not consider this to be a shortcoming, however, because of the high
familiarity of the action we studied—typical walking. All of the par-
ticipants walked to the lab, passing through a number of doorways
along the way. Walking through narrow openings is a highly prac-
ticed action, which may in part explain why the magnitude of the
effect was small—participants ﬁne-tuned their pre-existing abili-
ties to perceive affordances for ﬁtting through apertures. Most
likely, participants were already close to ceiling performance be-
fore receiving action experience. Indeed, participants who made
perceptual judgments without speciﬁc practice on the doorway
apparatus erred by only 3.11 cm.
What, then, did participants learn from performing the target
action? One possibility is that action experience increased percep-
tual sensitivity. However, we found no evidence that perceptual
judgment functions were sharper or more ﬁnely attuned for ac-
tion-ﬁrst compared to perception-ﬁrst participants. For both
groups, the slopes of the perceptual judgment functions were shal-
lower than the slopes of the underlying affordance functions. The
region of uncertainty in perceptual judgments spanned a few cen-
timeters. Even when perceptual judgments closely matched the
probability of success, most participants did not make consistent
responses across trials. That is, participants did not pick a single
criterion doorway size and say ‘yes’ to every larger doorway and
‘no’ to every smaller doorway. Instead, they often responded differ-
ently to same-sized or almost same-sized doorways throughout
the perceptual judgment task, regardless of condition.
More likely, feedback from performing the action highlighted
the relation between dimensions of the doorway and participants’bodies as they tried to ﬁt. We found evidence that performing the
target action led to differences in how participants scaled decisions
to their body dimensions. Whereas perception-ﬁrst participants’
thresholds did not correlate with body dimensions, action-ﬁrst
participants showed remarkably strong correlations between
height, weight, and perceptual judgment thresholds. But although
weight was the best overall predictor of affordance thresholds, par-
ticipants’ judgments were best predicted by height. If action per-
formance helped participants scale decisions to body dimensions,
why did participants scale to a less robust predictor?
Possibly, participants scaled judgments to height rather than
weight because they have direct perceptual access to their eye-
height (Mark, 1987; Mark et al., 1990; Warren & Whang, 1987),
but they do not have direct visual access to their weight or width
or compression of their bodies. Although height does not perfectly
predict participants’ ability to pass through doorways, it is still
strongly correlated with affordance thresholds. Scaling judgments
to eye-height might not be exact, but could serve as a close-enough
approximation. We predicted perceptual judgment thresholds for
the perception-ﬁrst group using the scaling relationship that ac-
tion-ﬁrst participants used. As a group, perception-ﬁrst participants
wouldhave beenmore accurate had they scaled decisions for height,
and the majority of participants would have been more accurate.
The current study differs from traditional studies of perceptual
learning in that participants judged an affordance, the ability to
pass through the doorway, as opposed to an extrinsic, perceptual
property, such as distance, size, shape, or color. Although metric
properties of the doorway are relevant to the perceptual judgment
of the affordance—the observer must perceive doorway width in
relation to body dimensions—how accurately the observer per-
ceives metric properties in isolation may be another question alto-
gether. For example, Stefanucci and Geuss (2009) found that
broad-shouldered participants underestimate the width of an
opening (through a perceptual-matching response) compared to
narrow-shouldered individuals: Judgments of perceptual proper-
ties are biased by the possibilities for passage. However, in the cur-
rent study, we found no systematic bias in the direction of errors
based on body dimensions. Most likely, asking participants to
judge affordances for passage rather than doorway size eliminated
biases because affordance judgments, by deﬁnition, relate body
size to doorway size.
In conclusion, observers can use past experiences performing a
target action to improve the accuracy of future judgments about
that action. Action performance provides feedback about the con-
sequences of performing the action. The current study suggests
that participants can exploit feedback from speciﬁc action experi-
ence—walking through doorways—to make more accurate judg-
ments than participants with only general action experience—
walking in an upright posture. In other words, learning by moving
is good, but learning by doing is better.
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